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CASE SUMMARIES
Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115 (81 Cir. 1999).

Federal restrictions on the use of motorboats in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness have been
controversial since the Wilderness Act of 1964 included the BWCAW in a newly created national system of
wilderness areas. The Wilderness Act of 1964 generally prohibited the use of motorboats in wilderness areas,
although it did allow for any pre-existing use of motorboats in the BWCA to continue. The "grandfather" clause
for motorboats was superceded in 1978 by the passage of the BWCA Wilderness Act, banning motorboats in
the BWCA, except on certain waterways, where the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture
("USDA") was directed to establish specific use quotas. The current two cases, consolidated by the United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota, challenge the motorboat use and visitor restrictions
promulgated by the Forest Service's BWCAW Management Plan and Implementation Schedule of 1993 (the
Wilderness Plan).
Plaintiffs sued the United States Forest Service ("USFS") and the USDA, which manage the BWCAW,
claiming the restrictions in the Wilderness Plan violated the statutes governing the BWCAW. The USFS
concluded that use levels had begun to "strain" the wilderness environment requiring the Service to restrict
visitor and motorboat use in the BWCA through a quota system. Entry point restrictions, special permits for
commercial towboats, and a special exemption from the motorboat quota system for homeowners, resort
owners, and their guests were all implemented.
The first group of plaintiffs, collectively called the "Outfitters," claimed that the Wilderness Plan unduly
limited access to the BWCAW in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). The Outfitters claimed the definition of
"guest" was inconsistent with the language of the statute and was a departure from how the agency had defined
the word in the past. They also claimed that the USFS violated NEPA by developing a EIS that failed to include
all reasonable alternatives, relied on flawed data, and insufficiently evaluated all of the significant social and
economic effects of the Wilderness Plan. The second group of plaintiffs, collectively called the
"Environmentalists," intervened in the Outfitters' suit and bought its own challenge to the Wilderness Plan.
They claimed that the plan allowed the excessive use of motorboats in the BWCAW by its allocation of special
use permits for towboats and by defining certain connected lakes as a single lake, on which homeowners, resort
owners, and their guests were exempt from the quota system. The Environmentalists contended that the
Wilderness Plan was thus a violation of the BWCAW Act and the APA.
The district court dismissed the Outfitters' and Environmentalists' APA claims, ruling the contested
portions of the Wilderness Plan were consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the BWCAW Act. The court
also dismissed the Outfitters' NEPA claims, ruling that the Outfitters lacked standing under NEPA to assert their
claims because their complaint of potential economic loss was not a protected interest under NEPA. The court
also dismissed the Outfitters' ADA claim, which was not appealed.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held the USFS concern that towboats could become a disproportionate share
of the motorboat quota was reasonable. The court found that the "plain language of the statute" empowered the
Secretary of Agriculture to implement entry point quotas, as long as those quotas did not exceed the average use
from 1976-78. The court noted that the number of special use permits for towboats--when added to the balance
of motorboat quotas--did not exceed the BWCAW Act's overall restrictions on motorboat use. The court
concluded that issuing special use permits for towboats was consistent with the statute.
The court rejected the Outfitters' argument that the USFS had defined the word "guest" differently in the
past, finding that the agency had not previously defined the word at all, nor had it changed its policy in a
manner that was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The court concluded the USFS's definition of
"guest" was a reasonable attempt to comply with the overall congressional intent of protecting the wilderness by
using motorboat quotas.
The court reversed the lower court's decision against the Environmentalists and found the USFS
interpretation of the statutory term "that particular lake" to include chains of lakes was contrary to the plain
language of the BWCAW Act. It noted that elsewhere within the statute Congress referred to the individual
lakes in the chains by name and implemented specific restrictions for those lakes. Therefore, the court
concluded, the agency's interpretation of "that particular lake" was unreasonable and impermissibly expanded
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the statutory exemption from the motorboat quotas for landowners (and their guests) whose property abuts those
lakes.
The court found the Outfitters did have prudential standing under NEPA to challenge the USFS's EIS
because the Outfitters' claims were within the "zone of interests" protected by the particular provision of NEPA.
In reversing the lower court's decision, the appeals court relied the proposition that the plaintiffs "can assert an
injury arising from the agency's failure to take into consideration the particular purposes or provisions" of
NEPA.
Turning to the merits of the Outfitters NEPA claims, the court rejected the Outfitters' claim that the USFS
intentionally limited the alternative plans it considered and was predisposed toward alternatives that reduced
visitor use. The court noted the EIS was "a long and detailed document" that included ten alternative plans,
eight of which were given detailed study, and two of which did not call for reduced visitor use. Additionally, the
court ratified the USFS's decision not to study further alternative plans that would have increased visitor use of
the BWCAW. The court found that the USFS's concern that visitor use levels were beginning to strain the
viability and solitude of the wilderness area and to degrade the intended primitive recreational experience was
reasonable and furthered the goals of NEPA. The court also rejected the Outfitters' claims that the EIS was
invalidated by the use of flawed data and methodologies, and declined to choose between different studies,
expert views, and schools of scientific thought. Finally, the court found that the Outfitters had inadequate
evidence to support their contention that the EIS inadequately considered all of the significant social and
environmental effects of the Wilderness Plan. Accordingly, the court found that the EIS adequately considered
the environmental, recreational, social, and economic impacts of the Wilderness Plan, and that the Forest
Service's use of methodologies, studies, and data was not arbitrary or capricious.
DAVID KURTZ
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir 1999).

Petitioners filed complaints against the EPA for its revision of national ambient air quality standards
("NAAQS") for ozone and particulate matter ("PM") under the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). The court made seven
holdings in this matter. In its holdings, the D.C. Court of Appeals stated: (1) construction of Act on which the
EPA relied in revising PM and ozone NAAQS effected unconstitutional delegation of legislative power; (2) the
EPA could not consider environmental consequences resulting from financial impact on the federal Abandoned
Mine Reclamation Fund Act in revising ozone and PM NAAQS; (3) even if Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
required the EPA to prepare regulatory impact statement (RIS) when setting NAAQS, judicial relief for failure
to comply was unavailable; (4) the EPA properly certified, under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, that revised
NAAQS would not have significant economic impact upon substantial number of small entities; (5) the EPA
must enforce any revised primary ozone NAAQS under the 1990 amendments to Clean Air Act; (6) in revising
NAAQS for troposphere ozone, the EPA was required to consider the health benefits of ozone; and (7) the
EPA's decision to regulate coarse particulate matter indirectly was arbitrary and capricious. Ultimately, this
case stands for the idea of when the EPA sets regulations without a firm scientific basis for its actions, the new
regulations can be questioned and challenged as unconstitutional. How the court will decide if the action is
outside the scope of the EPA's power will vary on how unreasonable the court finds the regulations.
The court broke this case into four distinct parts with separate holdings for each section. Part I of the case
involved the small business petitioners against the EPA. They claimed that the EPA in its role of setting
NAAQS guidelines exceeded its scope by not listing any specific, quantitative pollution data. The court never
questioned the EPA's duty to issue air quality guidelines in accordance with the CAA; federal law requires the
EPA to set pollution guidelines at a level that protects the public health as well as leaves a margin for safety.
However, the complaint here is one of a lack of a "cut off point"; exactly how much ozone and PM pollution is
allowed?
The ozone level stated in the new NAAQS was .08 ppm. The EPA claimed simply that lower levels of
ozone had a transient effect on people, resulting in less if any harm. The court found this reasoning
inconclusive and simply intuitive on the part of the EPA and lacking any technical or scientific reasoning. The
advisory committee designed to assist the EPA in its creation of regulations, the Clean Air Scientific Advisory
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Committee, also favored the .08 standard, but again, the court found no scientific reasons for such a decision.
Without real reasons for setting ozone levels at .08, the EPA had no "intelligent principle" needed to validate an
agency ruling. The court found no such principle existed in the present case, and thereby invalidated the EPA's
new guidelines. The EPA's last argument was that lower ozone levels are similar to natural peak ozone levels,
thus making it impossible to tell natural ozone from man-made pollution. The court found this argument
unpersuasive as the EPA made no explicit adoption of this idea in its new ozone rule.
Part II of the opinion discussed other general claims against the EPA by all petitioners and amici regarding
the proposed ozone and PM standards; the court denied relief on all claims. In the first claim the petitioners
thought it unfair that the EPA did not consider costs; however, regulations specifically forbid the EPA from
considering cost factors when setting NAAQS. The EPA argued that the Lead Industries case controlled the
current issue regarding cost provisions. The petitioners tried to distinguish Lead Industries from the current
action, but the court flatly rejected petitioners' arguments, finding them inconsistent with the CAA statute
which forbids any cost considerations. The State Petitioners argued that the EPA erred in failing to consider
any environmental consequences resulting from financial impact on the federal Abandoned Mine Reclamation
Fund Act. The court quickly dismissed this claim as it was addressed and foreclosed in the matter of NRDC v.
EPA. That case clearly held that the EPA may only consider health effects relating to pollutants. Petitioners
also claimed the EPA failed to follow certain NEPA provisions, most notably the requirement of preparing an
environmental impact statement. For this argument, petitioners relied on PortlandCement Association v.
Ruckleshaus. In that case, the court held that a NEPA statement is required in conjunction with a CAA
alteration. However, petitioners overlooked the fact that the case dealt only with a specific section of the CAA,
so petitioners' faith in PortlandCement was not warranted. Additionally, statute directly supercedes Portland
Cement. Petitioners also raised an economic argument, but that does not work due to § 109(d) specifically
forbidding economic considerations.
State Petitioners and Congressman Bliley raised the next claim. They charged federal law required the EPA
to file a regulatory impact statement (RIS) and to choose the least burdensome means to achieve their goals.
Even if true, the court could not grant any petitioners relief, the lack of an RIS does not render an agency rule
invalid A court could consider an agency's behavior as capricious if it does not prepare an RIS. This course of
action was unavailable as the Thompson case considers the "validity of the rule under other provisions of the
law," and the court in the present matter could not find any impropriety in the way the EPA set the ozone and
PM NAAQS.
The final charge regarding the NAAQS concerned the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The small business
petitioners claimed the EPA failed to consider the NAAQS' impact on smaller entities. The court held that the
EPA does not have to answer this claim because the EPA does not directly regulate small businesses. The states
themselves rule over small businesses directly via state implementation plans; only if the state does not provide
a state implementation plan will the EPA exercise its authority and set regulations.
Part III of the action dealt directly with ozone regulations. In response to continued ozone pollution,
Congress responded by creating new ozone standards found in CAA. This section required EPA to designate
areas which cannot reach the .12 ppm ozone level set as the primary goal. The State and non-State petitioners
with Congressman Bliley as amicus argued that Subpart two of 42 U.S.C. §7511 precluded EPA from revising
existing ozone NAAQS, primary or secondary. The court decided some arguments in the EPA's favor, saying
the EPA can promulgate revised NAAQS standards; however, the court sided with the petitioners by stating that
the EPA's NAAQS guidelines must be in compliance with Subpart two as well and by stating that the EPA
cannot enforce secondary ozone standards in an area that has not yet attained primary ozone standards. The
other major claim concerning ozone regarded possible health benefits. There, the court held the EPA erred in
not considering possible health benefits. Petitioners presented evidence that ozone in the troposphere indeed
has some positive health benefits, most notably screening out ultraviolet radiation. On this charge, the EPA
erred in not in considering "all identifiable effects" as required by the CAA. The court remitted this portion of
the case with instructions to account for possible benefits of ozone.
The final part of this case dealt with the PM side of the NAAQS. All NAAQS standards attempt to regulate
PM with a diameter of less than ten micrometers (PMo). Petitioners claimed no scientific evidence existed that
PM is a health hazard and if so, the EPA's method was arbitrary and capricious and should not be enforced.
The court found no support for the first argument; the EPA had justification to regulate PM as ample evidence
supports PM affecting health. However, the court ruled that the EPA's method as arbitrary and in need of
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revision. In its holdings, the court pointed out, among other things, that PM regulations for other categories,
like PM 2.5 already existed. The EPA's proposed method yielded a double regulation of categories such as PM .
25
and not effectively serve PA's goal of regulating PM1 o. Additionally, the court pointed to regression studies
analysis that yield different amounts of PM10 depending on how much PM 2.5 is present.
KEVIN JOHNSON
Treadway v. State of Missouri, 998 S.W. 2d 508 (1999).

Federal law requires each state to establish a basic vehicle inspection and maintenance program and an
implementation plan for all areas classified as a "moderate" ozone nonattainment area. Each state is also
required to implement a "rate of progress plan" to reduce emissions of ozone pollutants in any designated
moderate ozone nonattainment area. The St. Louis region failed to meet the federal clean air standards and was
classified as a moderate ozone nonattainment area. Missouri was required to establish a program that would
bring the level of pollution within the clean air standards or it could face federal sanctions, such as the loss of
federal highway construction funds. In order to comply with the federal clean air standards, The Missouri
General Assembly enacted sections 307.366 and 643.305 to establish basic and enhanced vehicle emission
testing programs in the St. Louis area because the level of ozone pollution exceeded the federal clean air
standards. Joseph Treadway, Plaintiff, claimed the enactment of these sections violated the restriction on the
passage of special or local legislation under Article III, Section 40(30) of the Missouri Constitution. At the time
the statutes were enacted, the St. Louis area was the only region in Missouri that needed to establish both a
basic vehicle inspection program and an implementation plan as required by the Clean Air Act.
Treadway argued that these two statutes violate Article III, Section 40(30) of the Missouri Constitution,
which states that "the general assembly shall not pass any local or special law ... where a general law can be
made applicable." Treadway claimed that the statutory scheme violates the Missouri Constitution because it
excludes all areas except for the St. Louis metropolitan area and the law should apply to all cities and counties
that are designated moderate ozone nonattainment areas. The State argued that the statutes are general laws and
do not violate the Missouri Constitution because the statutes use open-ended criteria (population) to determine
which cities and counties must comply with the statute. The State further argued that even if the statutes were
classified as "local or special," they are in compliance with article III, § 40(30) of the Missouri Constitution.
The State claimed that a local or special law is not unconstitutional if the problem the statute sought to correct is
so unique to the place classified by the law that a general law could not achieve the same result. The state
moved for summary judgment on the above grounds. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in the favor
of the State against Treadway.
Treadway appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court, which affirmed the Circuit Court's ruling. The
Missouri Supreme Court began its analysis of Treadway's claim by determining whether the statutes were
general or special laws. Treadway argued that the statutes were special because they excluded all cities and
counties except for the St. Louis area. The Court concluded the statutes were general because they established
classifications based on population, which is an open-ended criteria. The Court relied heavily upon its prior
decision in School DistrictofRiverview Gardens, 816 S.W. 219 (1991), which held that statutes which establish
classifications by population are general laws, even if no other city or county will come within the population
classification during the lifetime of the statutes. Later in the decision, the Court again addressed the issue as to
whether the statutes were general laws by considering the fact that the General Assembly did not follow the
procedures for passing special or local legislation. Since the General Assembly did not publish a notice
indicating that the statutes were special laws, which is required under the procedures for passing special
legislation, the Court assumed that the General Assembly must have intended to pass the statutes as general
laws.
After determining the statutes were general, the Court addressed the issue of whether the use of population
to establish classes is rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose. Without discussing what relationship
population has to the legislative purpose of improving the air quality of the state, the Court said that the
legislature has broad discretion in attempting to create solutions to societal problems. The Court found that
Treadway failed to show an irrational relationship existed, and then it concluded that population was rationally
related to a legitimate purpose. Finally, the Court addressed the State's argument that even if the statutes were
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special laws, the statutes are valid because general statutes could not achieve the same results. The Court stated
that the General Assembly could have enacted these statutes as general laws because the St. Louis region was
the only area in Missouri that had an ozone emissions problem.
CLIFFORD McKIssON
Nat'l Bank of Commerce of El Dorado, Ark. v. Dow Chem. Co., 65 F.3d 602 (8h Cir. 1999).

The representatives of Matthew Arnold and his father Michael David filed a claim against Dow Chemical
Co. (Dow), Rofan Services, Inc. (Rofan), Epco Inc. (Epco), United Industries Corp. (United), Ciba Geigy
Corp.(Ciba Geigy), Chevron Chemical Co.(Chevron), and Bengal Chemical Co. (Bengal), alleging that these
companies manufactured and produced insecticides that resulted in Matthew Arnold's birth defects. The
Arnolds based these claims on theories of negligence, products liability, and breach of warranty. Dow
manufactures the chemical Dursban, which United uses to formulate and distribute Spectracide Dursban Indoor
and Outdoor Insect Control (Spectracide). Ciba Gigy manufactures the chemical Ciazinon that Chevron uses to
formulate and distribute the product Ortho Hi-Power Ant, Roach, and Spider Spray/Formula II (Ortho). Bengal
manufactures and distributes Bengal Roach Spray. The Arnolds appealed the district court's ruling of summary
judgment to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
To deal with a household insect problem, Jerry and Patricia Arnold allegedly applied three pesticides
manufactured and distributed by the defendants. The Arnolds further contend that they used these products
when their son and daughter-in-law, Michael and Debra Arnold, moved into their home in December of 1992.
Soon after she moved in, Debra Arnold became pregnant with Matthew Arnold who was born on September 7,
1993. The pesticides were allegedly used in the home until April 1, 1993.
The defendant companies all obtained proper registration by identifying their product's chemical,
toxicological, physiological, biochemical, environmental, and ecological characteristics. The EPA then issues a
Pesticide Fact Sheet summarizing the products' information. The statutory framework for this process is
provided by the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"). As such, the companies moved
for summary judgment, claiming that all the plaintiffs' counts were preempted by FIFRA. The Arnolds sought
to delay summary judgement by claiming additional discovery would be helpful. The district court denied
further discovery and granted the company's motion for summary judgement stating that all the plaintiffs'
claims were expressly preempted by a FIFRA section 136 v.
The Appellants first contended that the summary judgement of the trial court was inappropriate because
discovery had not been completed. They argued that additional discovery was needed so that they could gather
more evidence in support of their responses to the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgement. However, the
three appellate judges found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying further discovery
because the Appellants' failed to show how additional discovery would alter the evidence before the district
court. Furthermore, the Court found that since the district court has responsibility to determine when there has
been adequate time for discovery, they did not abuse their discretion by ruling on summary judgement after
over a year of discovery had been completed. The second argument centered on the claim that summary
judgement in favor of Dow Chemical was inappropriate because a question remained as to whether Spectracide
was actually used in the Arnolds' home. The Circuit court found that since it was essential to prove the
Spectracide product was actually used in the Arnolds' home, the summary judgement was proper because
during discovery, Dow produced uncontroverted evidence that the distributor in question never sold or stocked
this specific pesticide. The final argument offered by the Appellants centered on the issue of FIFRA
preemption Because previous case law in the Eighth Circuit held state common law claims of inadequate
labeling and failure to warn are clearly preempted by FIFRA, the Court sustained the summary judgement with
relation to the negligence, and products liability claims. The opinion concluded by discussing the claim of
defective manufacture or design based upon the presence of toxic impurities in the goods. Specifically, the
Arnold's contended that the Ortho chemical was contaminated by the toxic substance Sulfotepp, which has been
know to cause fetal malformations. The Court found that these claims are not preempted by FIFRA because
defects can result even though the ingredients of the chemical can be known, approved and accounted for in the
EPA-approved label. However, the Court found that since this claim of defective manufacturing lacked
sufficient evidentiary support it would fail because a case founded on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to
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survive summary judgement. Appellants failed to prove the Ortho product, with our without the contaminant,
was unreasonably dangerous, and failed to establish whether the defective condition proximately caused the
harm. Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution mandated a summary judgment against the Arnolds' state law claims of negligence, inadequate
labeling, products liability, and failure to warn because the state law was contrary to federal law and, thus, was
preempted by FIFRA.
ANDREw SCHOIZ

ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS
Missouri Attorney General and Premium Standard Farms: A Consent Decree to Clean Up

In early August, Jackson County Circuit Court Judge Edith Messina approved a consent degree between
Premium Standard Farms, Inc., and the Missouri Attorney General's Office. The consent decree requires
Premium Standard Farms to spend $25 million in waste treatment technology (half within the next three years
and the rest within five years) to deal with odor and pollution problems at its corporate hog farms in northern
Missouri and pay a $1 million dollar fine. The company has around 105,000 sows in five Missouri counties
(Mercer, Putnam, Sullivan Daviess and Gentry counties) which produce an average of 2 million pigs a year.
Attorney General Jay Nixon and Premium Standard Farms Vice President of Communications Charlie
Arnot said the decree will achieve a variety of outcomes. "In addition to leveling a significant penalty, we are
attempting to fix the problem and to provide relief for the hundreds of Missourians whose lives have been
disrupted by the stench of these giant factory farms," Nixon said. "If we can [solve the problem] through the
consent decree, then I think it will be judged a tremendous success by anybody," Arnot said. The decree,
however, does not prevent the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") from an action also recently filed
against the company, nor does it prevent the Attorney General from taking steps against Premium Standard
Farms if future violations occur.
The present agreement is the result of a history of environmental violations by Premium Standard farms
dating back before 1995. In 1996, the company entered into a consent decree for the violations requiring
remediation with the Department of Natural Resources. Attorney General Jay Nixon initiated his own action in
the Jackson County Circuit Court after Premium Standard Farms was found to have committed further
environmental violations which has resulted in the current consent decree. Part of the $ 1 million in settlement
fees was given to schools in Putnam, Mercer, Sullivan, Jackson and Daviess counties in August. As for the $25
million dollar technology change agreement, Arnot said that Premium Standard Farms in early November
completed step one in the process when they submitted a work plan to the Attorney General and a panel of three
experts in livestock waste management from across the nation. He said that the Attorney General's office gave
the company a lot of leeway in developing their own plan based on their needs.
If approved, the plan will provide for technology changes in two of the company's farms. First, it will
implement a series of proven technology changes at one farm including the use of permeable lagoon covers,
aeration basins, nutrient reduction basins and air dams. Second, the plan will, at another farm, begin several
experimental technology changes on a pilot basis. These include installing a solids concentration system to
collect solids and installing filtration systems on the water. Once approved by the three-person panel, Arnot
said Premium Standard Farms plans to implement the changes as soon as possible.
TANYA WHrIE
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